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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )
vs.

)

LAWRENCE J. SORENSON,

Case No.

16827

)

Defendant/Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant-Appellant,

Lawrence J.

Sorenson,

(here-

inafter Defendant) appeals from a verdict and judgment of guilty
on four counts of Theft and/or Theft by Deception in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 6, § 404 and/or 405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Defendant was charged and tried by a
counts of Theft

and/or Theft

found guilty of Counts I

by Deception.

jury on six

The Defendant was

through IV and a judgment was entered

thereon. Verdicts of not guilty were returned on Counts V and VI.
Defendant

appeals - from

the

verdicts

and

judgments

entered on

Counts I through IV.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgments on Counts I
through IV and judgments in his favor as a matter of law, or that
failing, a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

PREFACE
The Complaint

against

the Defendant charged theft in

that he "did obtain by deception or exercise unauthorized control
over the property of another."
to

restate

contained

the
in

facts

consistent

the Complaint.

representations

Difficulty arises in attempting

made by

with

the

Additionally,

the Defendant

alternative

charges

due to the numerous

and ·the general verdict

returned it is impossible to determine, assuming theft by deception,

which

representations

Inasmuch as
questions

the

jury

deemed

of

law and not

the

sufficiency of

possible determinations of the jury.
I

and untrue.

the arguments presented herein are predicated upon

attempt has been made to restate the facts

Counts

made

the

evidence, no

consistent with all

The verdicts of guilty on

through IV are consistent with a

finding by the jury

that either the Defendant obtained funds from the Complainants by
making one

or more misrepresentations,

or,

having obtained the

funds lawfully, did exercise unauthorized control over the money,
or both.
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BACKGROUND
The facts relating to Counts I through IV show that the
Defendant formed Western Heritage, Inc.
as "W.H.I.")

in late 1977.

the Board of W.H.I.
page 290)

(hereinafter referred to

The Defendant served as Chairman of

and acted as its manager-director.

(Tr. at

The stated purpose of W.H.I. was to assist its clients

in establishing retail

franchise operations.

(Tr. at page 290)

On the 4th day of April, 1978, David Candland (hereinafter referred to as "Candland") and Lester Thatcher (hereinafter
referred
W.H.I.

to

as

"Thatcher")

seeking property,

from

Portland,

financing,

Oregon,

contacted

and professional assistance

for a restaurant they wished to establish in Utah.

The restaur-

ant was to be named Apple Dumplin' and was to be a joint venture
Candland and/or Thatcher testi-

between Candland and Thatcher.

fied that during their first meetings with D~fendant, he represented to them, among other things, that:

1)

W.H.I. could sell

them a piece of property for their restaurant at 941 South State,
Salt Lake City, Utah; 2)
dred percent

(100%)

W.H.I could procure for them one hun-

leaseback financing; 3) W.H.I. was a large,

successful, real estate development firm with offices around the
United

States;

4)

W.H. I.

had been

involved

in numerous

other

successful projects similar to theirs; 5) W.H.I. had a commitment
for

$10, 000, 000. 00

from

an

outside

financing

source;

and

W.H.I. was run and staffed by members of the L.D.S. church.
at pages 97, 98, 99, 195, 199, 200)

3

6)
(Tr.

Candland and Thatcher,

Page
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relying

on

one

or

more

of

the

representations

of

Defendant,

decided to proceed with the Defendant and W.H.I. in their attempt
to establl.sh the Apple Dumplin' .

COUNT I
On April 28, 1978, the Defendant requested and obtained
$5,000.00

from

Candland.

(State's

Exhibit

"7")

On

the same

date, Candland and Thatcher entered into an Earnest Money Agreement with W.H.I. on a piece of property located on State Street,
Salt Lake City.
payment

was

(State's Exhibit "5")

induced

by

the

additional

representations

money

needed

was

to

(State's Exhibit "13"

foregoing

made by

satisfy
Item 3)

the

the

Candland testified that
representations
Defendant

requirements

and the

that:
for

1)

the

financing

and was not to be applied to the

deposit required under the Earnest Money Agreement; 2) the money
was

a

refundable

deposit;

3)

funding was available subject to

their qualifying; 4) upon financing being approved all "up front"
monies would be returned;

and 5) the money was to be held in a

special trust or real estate escrow account.

(Tr. at pages 99 to

101)

was

The

business
business.

$5, 000. 00
account

received

of W.H. I.

from

Candland

placed

in

the

and spent in the regular course of

(State's Exhibit "17")
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:id

COUNT II
On the 3rd day of May, 1978, Thatcher paid to W.H.I. an
additional $5,000.00.

(State's Exhibit "8")

Thatcher testified

that he relied on the same representations cited above in making
the payment.

The payment was deposited in the business account

of W.H.I. and was spent in the regular course of business.

COUNT III
On the 17th day of June, 1978, Thatcher paid to W.H.I.
an additional $10,000.00.

(State's Exhibit "9")

Thatcher testi-

fied that this payment was induced by the representations of the
Defendant

that:

1)

Candland and Thatcher's financial statement

was insufficient to obtain the financing (Tr. at page 189); 2) he
(Defendant)

had

substantial

capital

with them and become their partner;

and was willing
3)

to

invest

that the first and last

months lease payment of $20,000.00 had to be immediately paid in
order for the financing to be approved; 4) he (Defendant) would
invest $10 ,000. 00

if Candland and Thatcher could come up with

another $10, 000. 00;

5)

money

would

($10,000.00)

actually obtained.
Thatcher was

financing had been approved; and 6)
be

returned

once

(Tr. at pages 191 to 193)

deposited

in

the

business

the

funding

was

The money paid by

account of W.H.I.

spent in the regular course of business.

Page 5

the
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and

COUNT IV
Thatcher

paid

an

$ 22, 000. 00

additional

to W. H. I.

by

means of two checks (State's Exhibits "6" and "10") in August of

1978.

Thatcher testified that both of these payments were in-

duced

by

the

representations

of

Defendant

that:

1)

previous

funding had fallen through; 2) a new source of funding had been
found but that additional up front money was needed to complete
the transaction due to the difference in interest rates the bank
was willing to pay a trust fund to deposit a compensating sum in
their bank,

and what the trust fund had demanded; 3) Defendant

was going to put up $50, 000. 00 of his own money to obtain the
funds;

the money would only be needed for a couple of days.

4)

(Tr. at page 193)

Of the $22,000.00 paid by Thatcher, $14,000.00

was

an

paid

out

$14, 000. 00
$8,000.00,

in

was

attempt

returned,

to

and

get

financing.

together

with

A portion of
the

remaining

it was placed in the business account of W.H.I. and

spent in the regular course of business.
For

the

sole purpose of clarifying the transcript on

file herein and the legal arguments that follow, the defendant's

:ijr1

testimony

contradicted

::~!

Defendant

testified

payments

on

the

the

that

foregoing

all

of

in almost every instance.

the payments were received as

State Street property pursuant to the Earnest

Money Agreement between himself and Candland and Thatcher.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY
RULED SECTION 77-31-17*, ENTITLED
"FALSE
PRETENSES
EVIDENCE
OF 11 ,
INAPPLICABLE
TO
PROSECUTIONS
ALLEGING THEFT
AND/OR
THEFT
BY
DECEPTION

With the enactment of the new Utah Criminal Code 1 in

1973 the legislature abolished the offense of "false pretense"
and other similar crimes and incorporated those offenses into a
single offense

designated

"theft".

Section 76-6-403 provides:

Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a
single offense embracing the separate offenses such as
those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick,
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense,
extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen property. An
accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that
it was committed in any manner specified in Sections
76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the
court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance
or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the
defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or
by surprise. (emphasis added)

At the time the new Utah Criminal Code was enacted, the legislature

left

unamended

§

77-31-17

of

the

Utah Code of Criminal

Procedure, which provides:
Upon a trial for having obtained, with an intent to
cheat or defraud another designedly by any false
pretense, the signature of any person to a written
instrument, or from any person any money, personal

*

Al I statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

1.

Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-1-101 to 76-10-1401, 1953 as amended

Page 7
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property or valuable thing, the defendant shall not be
convicted, if the false pretense was expressed in
language, unaccompanied by a false token or writing,
unless the pretense or some note or memorandum thereof
is in writing, subscribed by or in the handwriting of
the defendant, or unless the pretense is proved by the
testimony of two witnesses, or that of one witness and
corroborating circumstances; but this section shall
not apply to a prosecution for falsely representing or
persona ting another, and in such assumed character
marrying, or receiving any money or property.

The

legal

questions

raised

at

trial

and

presented

herein are 1) whether § 77-31-17 has continued applicability to
prosecutions alleging "theft" by deception, and if so; 2) whether
the Court erred by refusing to instruct the jury thereon in the
case at bar. 2
A comparison between the prior offense of "false pretense"

and the new inclusive crime of "theft" by deception re-

veals that the two crimes proscribe the same type of conduct and
and that the new offense of "theft" by deception envelopes the

2.

See 11 Utah New Criminal Code 11 , 73 Utah Law Review 718 at p. 750,footnote
210, wherein that author notes:
A provision of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure that the
Legislature left unamended requires, for conviction of false pretenses, the testimony of two witnesses or the existence of a
writing signed by or in the handwriting of the defendant or the
testimony of one witness and corroborating circumstances. Id. §
77-31-17 (1953). To the extent that this provision may be inter
preted to apply to the new deception offense, it should be re
pealed to avoid an adverse procedural effect upon consolidation.
See Perkins, supra note 3, at 320 (emphasis added)

Page 8
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same or similar elements of the prior offense of "false pre3
tense".
Under prior law, the State established the offense of
"false

pretense"

representations;

by

showing

that 1)

the defendant made

false

2) knowing them to be false; 3) with intent to

defraud; 4) received something of value from a victim; and 5) who
relied upon the representations.

Ballaine v District Court, 107

Utah 247, 255, 153 P.2d 265, 267 (1944). 4
provision with which defendant herein was
showing by

the

State

that 1)

Section 76-6-405, the
charged,

requires

a

the defendant did obtain control

over the property of another; 2) by deception; 3) with the purpose to deprive him thereof;
perty

exceeded

$1,000.00.

and that 4) the value of the proSection

76-6-401(5)

defines

that

"deception" occurs under the new Code as follows:
"Deception" when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false and that the actor
does not believe to be true and that is likely to
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact
that the actor previously created or confirmed by
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment
of another and that the actor does not now believe to
be true; or

3.

See "Utah New Criminal Code", 73 Utah Law Review 718

4.

See also, State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244, 351 P.2d 96 (1960);
State v. Timmerman, 88 Utah 481, 55 P.2d 1320 (1936);
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 P .628 (1920).

Page 9
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(c) Prevents another from acquring information likely
to affect his judgment in the transaction; or
(d)
Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest,
adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or
is or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows
will not be performed; provided, however, that failure
to perform the promise in issue without other evidence
of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that
the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promises would not be performed.

"false

:ti

pretense" and the new offense "theft by deception", together with

iill

The

the

express

similarity

legislative

between

the

statement

prior

that

the

offense

prior

of

offense is
leaves no

:r~\'

offense of

···

"false pretense" but merely consolidated and recodified it under

'.t~

another title. There appears no valid reason why the concerns and

::c

intent

~!ID

embodied under
doubt

that

the

the

expressed

offense of

legislature

by

the

"theft"

did

not

legislatures

by deception,

eliminate

enactment

the

of

§

77-31-17

should not have continuing force and effect under the new Criminal Code.
In addition

to. the

foregoing,

under well-established

·.t

rules of statutory construction, § 77-31-17 should be given continuing application.
sible

and

construed

This Court has long held that, where pos-

consistent with other enactments,
so

as

to

give meaning

statutes should be

and effect thereto.

Totorica
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,

v. Thomas 16 Utah 2d 1975, 397 P.2d 984 (1965)
17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965)
directed

that

statutes

give them effect.

should be

Section

And rus v. A1 lred,

The legislature itself has

liberally construed so as to

68-3-2 provides,

in relevant part:

The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects
of the statutes and to promote justice.
(emphasis
added)

In spite of the foregoing, the trial court held Section
77-31-17 inapplicable to "theft by deception" prosecutions which
leaves the section without any force of effect whatsoever. While
it is not reflected in the record, the trial court relied in part
on the title of the section in question in making its decision,
the title being "False Pretense - Evidence of".

This Court has

previously ruled that the titles to statutes are not part of the
statutes.

Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Packing Co.,

Utah 20 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966)
the statute

is

improper where

18

Reliance alone on the title of

the

language of

the

statute

is

unambiguous and the statute in question has apparent application.
Assuming,

arguendo,

that

the

Section

77-31-17

has

application to prosecutions for "theft by deception," its specific

application
One of

to

the

case

at bar requires

further analysis.

the charges consolidated within each count of

the State's case against the defendant herein is that he obtained
the

property

of

Thatcher and Candland by means

Obviously,· at this stage of the proceeding,
Page 11

of deception·

there is no way to
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determine which allegations or representations made by the defendant the jury found untrue and whether that representation was
sufficiently corroborated in compliance with

Section

77-31-17.

Neither is it possible to determine upon which charge the jury
based their verdict.

There can be no doubt,

however, that the

determination of sufficient corroboration is a factual determin-

:ri

ation to be made by the jury and that it is procedural error to
refuse to instruct the jury therein.

State v. Clawson, 6 Utah 2d

160, 308 P.2d 264; State v. Foust, 588 P.2d 170 (1978).
Defendant submits that the trial Court committed prejudicial

error

the jury on provisions

: :ru

contained in Section 77-31-17, after having been requested to do

I~

so by counsel,

in refusing

and

that

to

as

instruct

a

matter of

law

the Defendant is

entitled to a reversal, or in the alternative, a new trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY
EXCLUDED
AS
HEARSAY DEFENDANT'S
PROFERRED
EVIDENCE
CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR THE
REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO COMPLAINANTS

Complainants (Thatcher and Candland) testified throughout the State's presentation of its case that the primary representation made by the Defendant which induced them to deal with
W. H. I. ,
total

and which
of

eventually

$42, 000. 00,

through W.H. I.,

was

induced

that

100% leaseback

there

them to pay
was

to W. H. I. a

available

to

them,

financing for their restaurant.
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(Tr.

at pages

96,

97,

186,

J98,

203

and

205)

The

charge

of

"theft by deception" necessarily required the jury to determine
whether the Defendant made that representation knowing it to be
false.

5
As illustrated by the verbatim excerpts from the trans-

cript

set

forth

below,

numerous

attempts were made

to

elicit

testimony evidencing that other third parties had made representations

concerning

financing

to

the Defendant

and that it was

based on these third party conversations that Defendant in turn
made representations
changes between

the

to

the

Court

Complainants.

The specific inter-

and counsel with respect to the at-

tempts to elicit that testimony are as follows:
Transcript of testimony of Valoy 0. Adams at Tr. page
240, lines 13 to 19.

Q
Did they ever make a commitment to you
or Western Heritage Inc. concerning that financing?
A
The commitment was all verbal from
Anthony and Associates. They said yes, they would-MR. JONES:
Object to any statements
made on the other end. Clearly hearsay.
THE COURT:

It is hearsay.

Sustained.

Transcript of testimony of Valoy 0. Adams at Tr. page
241, lines 1 to 12
THE WITNESS:
All right, sir.
At
their own expense they flew to Utah to look over some
of the packages and some of the concepts that Western
Heritage was developing.
And at their expense they

5.

Section 76-6-401 (S)(a)

Page 13
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brought in a Mr. King, who, in Mr. Sorensen's office
and in the_presence of many of these people with whom
- we were attempting to finance did commit-MR.

JONES:

Objection, hearsay, your

Honor.
MR. McDOUGAL:
Your Honor, we're not
submitting the statements for the truth of the matter
contained therein; simply for the fact the statement was made. (emphasis added)
THE COURT:

The objection's sustained.

Q
(By Mr. McDougal)
Do you want to go
to the next? Anything else that they did rather than
what they said. Did they supply you with any materials?
did.

A
Well, what--! can't tell you what they
Did not--

MR. JONES:
The question was what they
did, your Honor and he's not responding.
Transcript of testimony of Lawrence J. Sorensen (Defendant) at Tr. page 302, lines 13 to 22

Q
Mr. Sorensen, I want to take you back
to 1977. Could you tell us what efforts were made on
behalf of Mr. Candland and Mr. Thatcher to obtain the
financing that you said was available?
A
Yes, originally we submitted when their
financial statement came in, we submitted the terms
that they had sent us to Mr. King. Mr. King informed
us-MR. JONES:
Objection to the statement
by Mr. King, your Honor. Hearsay.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

Transcript of testimony of Lawrence J. Sorensen (Defendant) at Tr. page 303, lines 7 to 27.

Q
Some time down the road, did you meet
with Mr. King concerning the financing?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A

Yes.

We did.

Q

And

A

He stated that he would---

Q

Mr. Sorensen--

what

happened

MR. JONES:

Mr. King.

that

meeting?

Your Honor--

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

at

I'm sorry.
Go ahead.

MR. JONES:
Object to any comments by
I think the witness is aware of that too.
THE COURT:

Ask your question.

Q
(By Mr. McDougal)
Tell us what happened. What was given to Mr. King and what did he
give back to you?

A
The applications were submitted that
had been submitted previously to him. He stated that
their financial-MR. JONES:

Objection.

THE WITNESS:

All right.

THE COURT:
You' re trying to tell us
what somebody else told you, sir. That's something
that can't be done.

As the above excerpts reflect, the Court excluded all
testimony concerning statements made to the Defendant and others
by third parties.
ment that

the

The Court ruled, in spite of counsel's argu-

statements were not being offered to

prove

the

truth of the matters asserted therein, that the statements were
hearsay and therefore inadmissable.

Page 15
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Rule

63,

Utah Rules of Evidence,

defines hearsay as:

Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the matter asserted ... (emphasis added)

There is no doubt that the solicited testimony would be
hearsay if it had been offered to prove the matter therein contained,

that there was actually money available to W.H. I.

re:

and the Complainants.

The issue therefore turns on whether the

evidence was offered for the truth of the matters asserted.
In the general discussion of what constitutes hearsay

~
:~1

evidence contained in 29 Am. Jur. 2d at § 496, the author states:
In the event a statement is introduced for the purpose
of establishing that a party relied and acted upon it,
such a statement is not objectionable on the ground
that it is hearsay. (emphasis added)

The Tenth Circuit applied the above general rule in a
case directly on point to the case at bar in Frank v. U.S., (10th
Cir.

1955) 220 F.2d 559, 563-64, wherein the defendant was con-

victed

of

mail

fraud

by

means

investments
concerning a

in connection with
of

false

"magnetic logger",

and

the

fraudulent

solicitations of

:ti!

representations

i:i:

an alleged oil finding device·

The court held it reversible error to preclude the defendant from
testifying concerning testimonials he had received praising the
accuracy of the device.

The court explained:

An offer was made to prove by Frank ... that he made 60
tests of
parties
drilling
accurate

the device and he was subsequently told by
familiar with the results obtained in the
of such wells that his predictions were
in every instance. This evidence was offered

Page
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upon the theory that it tended to show that Frank was
in _go~d. faith in making representations respecting
rel1ab1l1 ty of the device. The trial court rejected
the proffered testimony as hearsay.
The statements said to have been made to Frank by
third parties were not offered to prove that such
statements were true but as tending to show that Frank
was led thereby to believe that the magnetic logger
could be relied upon. Evidence of this character is
not objectionable as hearsay. (emphasis added)

In a

similar case,

involving

fraud,

Robert A. Pierce

Co. v. Sherman Gardens Company, (1966 Nevada), 419 P.2d 781, 784,
the court expressed the rule as follows:
Wherein intent to defraud is an issue, conversations
with third persons, or statements made by them, tending to negate an intent to defraud on the part of thg
party whose motive is material, are admissable.

There can be no doubt that intent was an issue in the
case before

this

Court,

specifically the questions

of whether

Defendant knew the representations he made to be false.

Indeed,

any prosecution under the theft by deception provisions of the
Utah Criminal
fusing

to

Code

admit

raises

the issue.

conversations

with

The trial court, by rethird

parties

tending

to

negate the requisite intent, effectively precluded the Defendant
from presenting to the jury evidence tending to show that he was
led

to

believe

that

could be relied upon.

6.

the

representations

concerning

financing

As pointed out to the Court (Tr. at page

See, in accord, People v. Marsh,
376, P.2d 300, 303-305.

(1962) 58 C.2d 732, 26 CA. R. 300,

Page 17
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241)

the statements were not offered to prove that such state-

ments were true but as evidence that such statements were made to
the Defendant and believed by him.
The wrongful exclusion of the statements due to the mis
application of the hearsay rule was highly prejudicial in that,
as

the

record

reflects,

the

State

relied heavily upon proving

that the Defendant knowingly misrepresented to Complainants the
availability and terms

for 100% leaseback financing.

Defendant

sincerely submits to this Court, based on this error alone, that
he is entitled to a new trial so that the finder of fact can be
presented all of the relevant evidence.

CONCLUSION
The trial Court committed,
of

the

Defendant,

two

prejudicial

over the proper objections
errors

which

deprived

the

Defendant from having the finders of fact evaluate the evidence
by the applicable legal requirements and from having them consider all admissable evidence.
The

trial

Court's

holding

that

Section

77-31-17 is

inapplicable to prosecutions for theft by deception is improper
in that it ignores both statutory and judicial rules which require its application.
Secondly,
critical

evidence

the

Court

relevant

to

improperly
the

excluded

Defendant's

as

hearsay

state of mind.
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Either or both of

the errors

committed by the trial

Court require a reversal of the convictions and that this matter
be remanded for a new trial.

Only a new trial can afford the

Defendant the opportunity to have a finder of fact consider all
of the evidence and to have that evidence measured by the proper
statutory standards necessary for a conviction.

ORAL ARGUMENT
Defendant/appellant's

counsel

respectfuly

requests

an

opportunity to orally argue the merits of the matters contained
herein.
DATED this 18th day of March, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,
McDOUGAL, HALEY & DAHL
250
East Broadway, Suite
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

330

Attorney for Appellant
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